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基于三方演化博弈的粤港澳大湾区药品监管策略优化研究
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| 篇名： | 基于三方演化博弈的粤港澳大湾区药品监管策略优化研究 |
| TITLE： | Research on Optimization of Drug Supervision Strategy of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game |
| 摘要： | 目的：为完善粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管机制提供参考。方法：基于演化博弈理论，对粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管阶段利益相关者进行识别，构建演化博弈模型，通过模型求解得到各方主体的行为选择演化稳定策略，并为完善粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管机制提出建议。结果与结论：本研究基于演化博弈理论构建了药政机关、药检机构和药品生产企业的三方演化博弈模型。根据本研究建立的模型，可知当生产企业的合规成本小于违规成本与贿赂花费之和减去所获得的额外收益，或者小于违规成本加上惩罚和名誉损失之和减去所获得的额外收益时，均能实现生产企业合规生产的均衡状态；监管概率与监管成本成反比，严格检测率与检测成本成反比；合规生产率、严格检测率与监管强度和处罚罚款成正比，且监管概率越高，严格检测率就越高，合规生产率也会逐渐升高。建议今后可尝试联动企业信息档案，奠定四方共治基础；引入“成本-收益”监管体系，合理利用第三方检测机构；明确人员责任边界，利用智慧系统实时监管等优化策略，以促进粤港澳大湾区药品安全监管水平的提高。 |
| ABSTRACT： | OBJECTIVE：To provide reference for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. METHODS ：Based on the evolutionary game theory ，the stakeholders of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in the stage of drug safety supervision were identified ；the evolutionary game model was established so as to obtain the behavioral selection and evolutionary stability strategy of the each party through and put forward the suggestions for improving the mechanism of drug supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS：Based on evolutionary game theory ，the three-party evolutionary game model of drug administration ，drug inspection and manufacturing enterprises was established. According to the model established in this study ，it could be concluded that：when the compliance cost of the production enterprise was less than the sum of the violation cost and the bribery cost minus the additional income ，or less than the sum of violation cost and punishment and reputation lossminus the additional income ，the manufacturing enterprises could achieve the equilibrium state of compliance production ；the supervision probability was inversely proportional to the supervision cost ，and strict inspection was inversely proportional to inspection cost ；compliance productivity rate and strict detection rate were in direct proportion to the intensity of supervision and penalties ；the higher the supervision probability was，the higher the strict detection rate was ，and the compliance productivity would gradually increase. It is proposed to link enterprise information files ，lay the foundation of four party cogovernance ；introduce the “cost-benefit”supervision system ，make reasonable use of the third-party inspection institutions ；clarify the boundary of personnel responsibility ，and use the intelligent system for real-time supervision so as to promote the improvement of drug safety supervision in Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Ba y Area. |
| 期刊： | 2021年第32卷第06期 |
| 作者： | 石荣丽，沈凯，赵笑妍 |
| AUTHORS： | SHI Rongli ，SHEN Kai，ZHAO Xiaoyan |
| 关键字： | 博弈论；演化博弈；粤港澳大湾区；药品安全监管 |
| KEYWORDS： | Game theory ；Evolutionary game ；Guangdong- |
| 阅读数： | 228 次 |
| 本月下载数： | 10 次 |
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